SUMMARY
An electronic mail message can easily be forged. Almost everything in
it, including the return address, is completely under the control of
the sender.
An electronic mail message can be manually traced to its origin if (1)
all system administrators of intermediate machines are both cooperative
and competent, (2) the sender did not break low-level TCP/IP security,
and (3) all intermediate machines are secure.
Users of cryptography can automatically ensure the integrity and
secrecy of their mail messages, as long as the sending and receiving
machines are secure.
FORGERIES
Like postal mail, electronic mail can be created entirely at the whim
of the sender. From, Sender, Return-Path, and Message-ID can all con-
tain whatever information the sender wants.
For example, if you inject a message through sendmail or qmail-inject
or SMTP, you can simply type in a From field. In fact, qmail-inject
lets you set up MAILUSER, MAILHOST, and MAILNAME environment variables
to produce your desired From field on every message.
TRACING FORGERIES
Like postal mail, electronic mail is postmarked when it is sent. Each
machine that receives an electronic mail message adds a Received line
to the top.
A modern Received line contains quite a bit of information. In con-
junction with the machine's logs, it lets a competent system adminis-
trator determine where the machine received the message from, as long
as the sender did not break low-level TCP/IP security or security on
that machine.
Large multi-user machines often come with inadequate logging software.
Fortunately, a system administrator can easily obtain a copy of a
931/1413/Ident/TAP server, such as pidentd. Unfortunately, some system
administrators fail to do this, and are thus unable to figure out which
local user was responsible for generating a message.
If all intermediate system administrators are competent, and the sender
did not break machine security or low-level TCP/IP security, it is pos-
sible to trace a message backwards. Unfortunately, some traces are
stymied by intermediate system administrators who are uncooperative or
untrustworthy.
CRYPTOGRAPHY
The sender of a mail message may place his message into a cryptographic
envelope stamped with his seal. Strong cryptography guarantees that
any two messages with the same seal were sent by the same cryptographic
entity: perhaps a single person, perhaps a group of cooperating people,
7 s/qmail:(forgeries)
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