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-.TH s/qmail: forgeries 7
-.SH "NAME"
-forgeries \- how easy it is to forge mail
-.SH "SUMMARY"
-An electronic mail message can easily be forged.
-Almost everything in it,
-including the return address,
-is completely under the control of the sender.
-
-An electronic mail message can be manually traced to its origin
-if (1) all system administrators of intermediate machines
-are both cooperative and competent,
-(2) the sender did not break low-level TCP/IP security,
-and
-(3) all intermediate machines are secure.
-
-Users of
-.I cryptography
-can automatically ensure the integrity and secrecy
-of their mail messages, as long as
-the sending and receiving machines are secure.
-.SH "FORGERIES"
-Like postal mail,
-electronic mail can be created entirely at the whim of the sender.
-.BR From ,
-.BR Sender ,
-.BR Return-Path ,
-and
-.BR Message-ID
-can all contain whatever information the sender wants.
-
-For example, if you inject a message through
-.B sendmail
-or
-.B qmail-inject
-or
-.BR SMTP ,
-you can simply type in a
-.B From
-field.
-In fact,
-.B qmail-inject
-lets you set up
-.BR MAILUSER ,
-.BR MAILHOST ,
-and
-.B MAILNAME
-environment variables
-to produce your desired
-.B From
-field on every message.
-.SH "TRACING FORGERIES"
-Like postal mail,
-electronic mail is postmarked when it is sent.
-Each machine that receives an electronic mail message
-adds a
-.B Received
-line to the top.
-
-A modern
-.B Received
-line contains quite a bit of information.
-In conjunction with the machine's logs,
-it lets a competent system administrator
-determine where the machine received the message from,
-as long as the sender did not break low-level TCP/IP security
-or security on that machine.
-
-Large multi-user machines often come with inadequate logging software.
-Fortunately, a system administrator can easily obtain a copy of a
-931/1413/Ident/TAP server, such as
-.BR pidentd .
-Unfortunately,
-some system administrators fail to do this,
-and are thus unable to figure out which local user
-was responsible for generating a message.
-
-If all intermediate system administrators are competent,
-and the sender did not break machine security or low-level TCP/IP security,
-it is possible to trace a message backwards.
-Unfortunately, some traces are stymied by intermediate system
-administrators who are uncooperative or untrustworthy.
-.SH "CRYPTOGRAPHY"
-The sender of a mail message may place his message into a
-.I cryptographic
-envelope stamped with his seal.
-Strong cryptography guarantees that any two messages with the same seal
-were sent by the same cryptographic entity:
-perhaps a single person, perhaps a group of cooperating people,
-but in any case somebody who knows a secret originally held
-only by the creator of the seal.
-The seal is called a
-.I public key\fR.
-
-Unfortunately, the creator of the seal is often an insecure machine,
-or an untrustworthy central agency,
-but most of the time seals are kept secure.
-
-One popular cryptographic program is
-.BR pgp .
-.SH "SEE ALSO"
-pgp(1),
-identd(8),
-qmail-header(8)