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-rw-r--r--src/tls_remote.c387
1 files changed, 387 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/tls_remote.c b/src/tls_remote.c
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tls_remote.c
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "ucspissl.h"
+#include "fmt.h"
+#include "stralloc.h"
+#include "str.h"
+#include "byte.h"
+#include "case.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "constmap.h"
+#include "tls_remote.h"
+#include "tls_errors.h"
+
+/** @file tls_remote.c -- TLS client functions
+ @brief connection functions: tls_conn, tls_exit;
+ verification functions: tls_certkey, tls_checkpeer, tls_fingerprint, tlsa_check;
+ tls_destination, tls_domaincert
+ dummy functions: tls_crlcheck
+
+ tls_checkpeer: r = 0 -> ADH, r = 1 -> wildcard DN, r = 2 -> DN, r = 3 -> CA; r < 0 -> error
+ tls_fingerprint: r = 0 -> failed, r = 1 -> ok; r < 0 -> error
+ tlsa_check: r = 0 -> nothing, r = usage + 1, r < 0 -> error
+*/
+
+/* Caution: OpenSSL's X509_pubkey_digest() does not work as expected.
+ I've included now: X509_pkey_digest() and X509_cert_digest() (as makro) */
+
+#define X509_cert_digest X509_digest
+
+int tls_certkey(SSL_CTX *ctx,const char *cert,const char *key,char *ppwd)
+{
+ if (!cert) return 0;
+
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx,cert) != 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!key) key = cert;
+
+ if (ppwd) SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx,ppwd);
+
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx,key,SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
+ return -2;
+
+ if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx) != 1)
+ return -3;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_conn(SSL *ssl,int smtpfd)
+{
+ SSL_set_options(ssl,SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ SSL_set_options(ssl,SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
+ return SSL_set_fd(ssl,smtpfd);
+}
+
+int tls_checkpeer(SSL *ssl,X509 *cert,const stralloc host,const int flag,const int verify)
+{
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *extensions;
+ const GENERAL_NAME *ext;
+ char buf[SSL_NAME_LEN];
+ char *dnsname = 0;
+ int dname = 0;
+ int num;
+ int len;
+ int fflag;
+ int i;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ fflag = flag;
+ if (flag > 20) fflag = flag - 20;
+ if (flag > 10) fflag = flag - 10;
+
+ /* X.509 CA DN/SAN name validation against DNS */
+
+ if (host.len && fflag > 4) {
+ extensions = (GENERAL_NAME *)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert,NID_subject_alt_name,0,0);
+ num = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(extensions); /* num = 0, if no SAN extensions */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ ext = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(extensions,i);
+ if (ext->type == GEN_DNS) {
+ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) // 0xmnnffppsL
+ if (ASN1_STRING_type(ext->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) continue;
+ dnsname = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(ext->d.ia5);
+ #else
+ if (OBJ_sn2nid((const char*)ext->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) continue;
+ dnsname = (char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ext->d.ia5);
+ #endif
+ len = ASN1_STRING_length(ext->d.ia5);
+ dname = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!dname) {
+ X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(cert),NID_commonName,buf,sizeof(buf));
+ buf[SSL_NAME_LEN - 1] = 0;
+ dnsname = buf;
+ len = SSL_NAME_LEN - 1;
+ }
+
+ switch (fflag) {
+ case 5: if (dnsname[0] == '*' && dnsname[1] == '.')
+ if (case_diffrs(dnsname + 1,host.s)) return -3;
+ if (case_diffrs(dnsname,host.s)) return -3;
+ rc = 3; break;
+ case 6: if (case_diffs(dnsname,host.s)) return -3;
+ rc = 2; break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* X.509 CA Verification: root CA must be available */
+
+ if (fflag > 3 && verify > -2) {
+ if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK) return -2;
+ else rc = 1;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int tls_checkcrl(SSL *ssl) // not implemented yet
+{
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int dig_ascii(char *digascii,const char *digest,const int len)
+{
+ static const char hextab[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
+ digascii[2 * j] = hextab[(unsigned char)digest[j] >> 4];
+ digascii[2 * j + 1] = hextab[(unsigned char)digest[j] & 0x0f];
+ }
+ digascii[2 * len] = '\0';
+
+ return (2 * j); // 2*len
+}
+
+/* X509_pkey_digest() takes the same args as X509_digest();
+ however returning the correct hash of pubkey in md.
+ Subjects keys are restricted to 2048 byte in size.
+ Return codes: 1: sucess, 0: failed. */
+
+int X509_pkey_digest(const X509 *cert,const EVP_MD *type,unsigned char *md,unsigned int *dlen)
+{
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+ unsigned int size = 2048;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *buf2;
+ unsigned char buffer[size]; // avoid malloc
+
+/* Following Viktor's suggestion */
+
+ if (!X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(cert)) return 0; // no Subject public key
+
+ len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert),0);
+ if (len > size) return 0;
+ buf2 = buf = buffer;
+ i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert),(unsigned char **)&buf2);
+ if (buf2 - buf != len) return 0;
+
+ if (!EVP_Digest(buf,len,md,dlen,type,0)) return 0; // OpenSSL voodoo
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Return codes: -4: no X.509 cert (fatal), -3: matching error (deferred),
+ -2: unsupported type, -1: weird TLSA record
+ 0: No X.509 cert; seen: usage++; */
+
+int tlsa_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,const stralloc host,const unsigned long p)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *methodsha256 = EVP_sha256();
+ const EVP_MD *methodsha512 = EVP_sha512();
+ stralloc out = {0};
+ stralloc sa = {0};
+ stralloc cn = {0};
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dlen = 0;
+ unsigned int n = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ int r;
+ char port[FMT_ULONG];
+ uint16 type;
+ uint16 selector;
+ uint16 usage;
+
+// construct TLSA FQDN -- simple procedure; returning Usage
+
+ if (host.len < 2) return 0;
+ if (!stralloc_copyb(&sa,"_",1)) temp_nomem();
+ port[fmt_ulong(port,p)] = 0;
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&sa,port)) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&sa,"._tcp.")) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&sa,host.s)) temp_nomem();
+
+ if (dns_cname(&cn,&sa) > 0) // query name could be a cname
+ { if (dns_tlsa(&out,&cn) <= 0) return 0; }
+ else
+ { if (dns_tlsa(&out,&sa) <= 0) return 0; }
+ if (out.len < 5) return -1;
+
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man3/X509_digest.html (1.1.1):
+ "The len parameter, if not NULL, points to a place where the digest size will be stored."
+ [sigh]
+ */
+
+ do {
+ usage = (unsigned char) out.s[i]; // Usage: PKIX-TA [0], PKIX-EE [1], DANE-TA [2], DANE-EE [3]
+ selector = (unsigned char) out.s[i + 1]; // Selector: 0 = Cert, 1 = SPKI
+ type = (unsigned char) out.s[i + 2]; // Type: 0/1/2 = [Cert|SPKI]/SHA256/SHA512
+
+ unsigned len = sk_X509_num(certs);
+ for (n = 0; n < len; n++) {
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs,n);
+ if (type == 1) {
+ if (selector == 0) r = X509_cert_digest(cert,methodsha256,digest,&dlen);
+ if (selector == 1) r = X509_pkey_digest(cert,methodsha256,digest,&dlen);
+ } else if (type == 2) {
+ if (selector == 0) r = X509_cert_digest(cert,methodsha512,digest,&dlen);
+ if (selector == 1) r = X509_pkey_digest(cert,methodsha512,digest,&dlen);
+ } else
+ return -2;
+
+ if (!byte_diff(digest,dlen,out.s + i + 3)) return ++usage;
+ }
+
+ i += (dlen + 3);
+ } while (i < out.len - 4);
+
+ return -3;
+}
+
+int tls_fingerprint(X509 *cert,const char *fingerprint,int dlen)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *methodsha1 = EVP_sha1();
+ const EVP_MD *methodsha224 = EVP_sha224();
+ const EVP_MD *methodsha256 = EVP_sha256();
+ const EVP_MD *methodsha512 = EVP_sha512();
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char digascii[257];
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ switch (dlen) { /* fetch digest from cert; len = bitlength/8 */
+ case 40: if (!X509_digest(cert,methodsha1,digest,&len)) return -2;
+ case 56: if (!X509_digest(cert,methodsha224,digest,&len)) return -2;
+ case 64: if (!X509_digest(cert,methodsha256,digest,&len)) return -2;
+ case 128: if (!X509_digest(cert,methodsha512,digest,&len)) return -2;
+ default: return -3;
+ }
+
+ len = dig_ascii(digascii,digest,len);
+ if (!str_diffn(digascii,fingerprint,len)) return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_exit(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ if (SSL_shutdown(ssl) == 0)
+ SSL_shutdown(ssl);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** @brief tls_destination
+ @param stralloc hostname (maybe 0-terminated)
+
+ Certificate Fallthru
+
+ @return values: | ADH | Cert *DN FQDN Hash | noTLSA noTLS
+ ----------+-----+--------------------+-------------
+ optional TLS | 1 | 3 - - - | - 9
+ mandatory TLS | 2 | 4 5 6 7 | 8
+
+ no TLS -1
+ */
+
+int tls_destination(const stralloc hostname)
+{
+ int i;
+ stralloc tlshost = {0};
+ stralloc tlsdest = {0};
+
+ if (!stralloc_copy(&tlshost,&hostname)) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_0(&tlshost)) temp_nomem();
+
+// Host rules
+
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"!")) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return -1;
+
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"?")) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 9;
+
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"/")) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 8;
+
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"%")) temp_nomem(); // CERT + hash
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 7;
+
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"=")) temp_nomem(); // CERT + FQDN
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 6;
+
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"~")) temp_nomem(); // CERT + Wild
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 5;
+
+// Domain rules
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tlshost.len; ++i) // TLS fallthru
+ if ((i == 0) || (tlshost.s[i] == '.')) {
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"?")) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s + i)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 9;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tlshost.len; ++i) // no TLSA
+ if ((i == 0) || (tlshost.s[i] == '.')) {
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"/")) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s + i)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 8;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tlshost.len; ++i) // CERT + Wild
+ if ((i == 0) || (tlshost.s[i] == '.')) {
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"~")) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s + i)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 5;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tlshost.len; ++i) // CERT - generic
+ if ((i == 0) || (tlshost.s[i] == '.')) {
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"")) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s + i)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 4;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tlshost.len; ++i) // ADH per host/domain
+ if ((i == 0) || (tlshost.s[i] == '.')) {
+ if (!stralloc_copys(&tlsdest,"-")) temp_nomem();
+ if (!stralloc_cats(&tlsdest,tlshost.s + i)) temp_nomem();
+ if ((tlsdestinfo = constmap(&maptlsdestinations,tlsdest.s,tlsdest.len))) return 2;
+ }
+
+// General rules (mandatory TLS)
+
+ tlsdestinfo = 0;
+ if (constmap(&maptlsdestinations,"/*",2)) return 8; // no TLSA
+ if (constmap(&maptlsdestinations,"=*",2)) return 6; // CERT + FQDN
+ if (constmap(&maptlsdestinations,"~*",2)) return 5; // CERT + Wild
+ if (constmap(&maptlsdestinations,"+*",2)) return 4; // CERT
+ if (constmap(&maptlsdestinations,"-*",2)) return 2; // ADH
+
+// Fall thru rules (optional TLS)
+
+ if (constmap(&maptlsdestinations,"?",1)) return 9; // fallback to no TLS
+ if (constmap(&maptlsdestinations,"*",1)) return 3; // CERT
+ if (constmap(&maptlsdestinations,"-",1)) return 1; // ADH
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_domaincerts(const stralloc domainname)
+{
+ int i;
+ tlsdomaininfo = 0; // extern
+
+/* Our Certs - per domain */
+
+ if (domainname.len)
+ for (i = 0; i < domainname.len; ++i)
+ if ((i == 0) || (domainname.s[i] == '.'))
+ if ((tlsdomaininfo = constmap(&mapdomaincerts,domainname.s + i,domainname.len - i))) return 2;
+
+/* Standard Cert (if any) */
+
+ if ((tlsdomaininfo = constmap(&mapdomaincerts,"*",1))) return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}